Alex Pierre v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-8-2019 
Alex Pierre v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"Alex Pierre v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 209. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/209 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 18-1592 
______________ 
 
ALEX H. PIERRE, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-17-cv-05327) 
Honorable Joel H. Slomsky, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 22, 2018 
 
BEFORE:  KRAUSE, COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 8, 2019) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Alex H. Pierre appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying his “Motion for Recusal and Amendment of 
Complaint.”  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Acting pro se, Pierre, an attorney who was suspended from the practice of law by 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, brought this action against the state supreme court 
and sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis.  According to Pierre, he could not be 
reinstated until he repaid in full (with interest) a disbursement made by the Pennsylvania 
Lawyers Fund for Client Security to his former client.  He was unable to do so.  
Meanwhile, he initiated a civil action against his landlord in the Philadelphia Court of 
Common Pleas, which granted judgment on the pleadings against Pierre.  Concluding that 
the state trial court committed an abuse of discretion, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
reversed.  The state suit proceeded to trial, where a jury eventually rendered a verdict 
against Pierre.  According to Pierre: 
A myriad of irregularities appeared at trial, with the trial court having ex 
parte communications in the removal of two jurors, ignoring case law cited 
for the proposition [that] replacement value is the measure of damages for 
items unlawfully discarded by a landlord after eviction and the awardability 
of punitive damages therefor, disregarding [an] unambiguous attorney 
admission [that] she was no agent of the landlord for purposes of tortious 
interference, twice instructing the jury not to award compensatory damages 
for the discarded goods, the jury having returned with a question on 
awarding damages for the quantity of items unlawfully trashed, as well as 
denying [a] post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law despite the 
absence of fact questions and [a] new trial despite controlling Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court law demanding [the] same for improper juror removals. 
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(Appellant’s Brief at 4-5 (citing Complaint at ¶¶ 24-27 (ECF No. 6)).)  The Pennsylvania 
Superior Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Pierre’s petition for 
allowance of appeal. 
On January 3, 2018, the District Court granted Pierre leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis.  However, it dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) 
for frivolousness and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which 
relief may be granted.  The District Court Clerk was directed to close the case.  
According to the District Court, Pierre’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims that the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment and the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were legally 
baseless on account of the Eleventh Amendment and because a state is not considered a 
person for purposes of § 1983.  It also rejected his breach of contract claims on the 
grounds that a judicial administration rule set forth in Pennsylvania’s Administrative 
Code did not constitute a contract.  
Pierre responded to the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint by filing a 
series of unsuccessful reconsideration motions through which Pierre also sought to 
amend his federal complaint.  On January 19, 2018, the District Court denied Pierre’s 
first motion for reconsideration.  Considering the amended complaint he sought to file 
with this motion, it determined that amendment would be futile, explaining, inter alia, 
that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the extent Pierre 
challenged and sought review of the state courts’ judgments and that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court Prothonotary was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.  On January 31, 
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2018, the District Court denied his “Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of 
Complaint Redux.”  In this motion, Pierre again attempted to file an amended complaint, 
only this time he sought to raise claims against the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The District Court concluded that 
the proposed amendment would be futile.  “Although Mr. Pierre alleges that he is of 
African-American descent, the facts alleged in his proposed amended complaint do not 
provide a plausible basis for concluding that he was intentionally discriminated against 
based on his race.”  (January 31, 2018 Order at 2 n.1 (ECF No. 10).)  Finally, Pierre filed 
a “Motion for Recusal and Amendment of Complaint,” which was denied on February 
16, 2018.  According to the District Court, disagreement with a judge’s rulings did not 
furnish a sufficient basis for recusal, Pierre failed to show any basis for reconsideration, 
and nothing in his motion altered the District Court’s conclusion that the facts alleged in 
his proposed amended complaint did not plausibly establish intentional discrimination on 
the basis of race. 
II. 
 According to Pierre, the District Court abused its “discretion by treating an 
indigent litigant differently in denying him meaningful access to the federal courts with 
dismissal of the complaint where amendment could cure.”1  (Appellant’s Brief at 5.)  He 
contends that futility could not justify the District Court’s denial of leave to amend 
because it acknowledged that a claim may be asserted under Title VI and that the District 
                                              
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 
and 1332.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Court failed to undertake the proper three-step plausibility analysis under Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
See, e.g., Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining 
that courts must take note of legal elements, then identify allegations that are not entitled 
to assumption of truth because they are no more than conclusions, and finally determine 
whether remaining well-pleaded factual allegations plausibly give rise to entitlement to 
relief).  Purportedly, Pierre alleged “the deliberate attempt on the part of the State courts 
under the totality of circumstances to keep one black attorney off its rolls.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief at 10.)   
We conclude that the District Court applied the appropriate legal standards in this 
pro se in forma pauperis proceeding.  In particular, it properly disposed of Pierre’s Title 
VI allegations, which were proffered for the first time as part of his second motion for 
reconsideration.  In its initial ruling dismissing his complaint, the District Court 
recognized that. “[t]o survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must 
contain ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Pierre v. Supreme Court of Pa., No. 17-5327, 2018 WL 283248, 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).  “‘[M]ere conclusory 
statements[ ] do not suffice.’”  Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).  Subsequently, it 
properly considered whether Pierre’s proposed amendments would be futile.  See, e.g., In 
re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 280 (3d Cir. 2004).  “His proposed 
amended complaint is based on essentially the same facts alleged in his prior pleadings 
except he now seeks to raise claims against the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pursuant 
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to Title VI, which prohibits intentional race discrimination in any program that receives 
federal funding.”  (January 31, 2018 Order at 2 n.1 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; Alexander 
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282-83 (2001)).)  We agree that the proposed pleading failed 
to raise “a reasonable inference that discovery will reveal evidence of the elements 
necessary to establish” intentional discrimination by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
based on race.  Connelly, 809 F.3d at 793.  The proffered complaint did not allege that 
Pierre ever notified the state appellate courts that he was the victim of racial bias on the 
part of the state trial court in the landlord-tenant dispute, point to any specific expressions 
of racial animus, or provide any intimation of disparate treatment of litigants because of 
their race.2  See, e.g., Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 272-73 (3d Cir. 
2014) (recognizing that plaintiffs may establish intentional discrimination under Title VI 
with showing of deliberate indifference but explaining that deliberate indifference 
requires actual as opposed to constructive knowledge). 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
                                              
2 We note that the proposed amended complaint alleged that the disciplinary rule 
requiring payments of fund obligations before reinstatement (with interest) is 
discriminatory in application because it prejudices minority attorneys who make up a 
disproportionate percentage of less well-heeled attorneys.  However, Pierre does not 
mention this cursory allegation in his appellate brief. 
